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ABSTRACT: In the paper I propose conceptions of argument, of uses
of argument, and of argumentation that rely upon the scholarly work of
recent years, but map the concepts and their relations in a slightly
different way. I contend that something like Toulmin’s backing-
warrant-claim model is the correct way to conceptualize argument, and
that, contrary to many current definitions, rational persuasion ought not
to be built into the very concept of argument, but instead understood as
a use of argument—one among others. Argumentation is best
conceived as exchanges of arguments, and the nature of these
exchanges will differ according to the use to which arguments are
being put in any given instance. Different uses of arguments are to be
distinguished in terms of the objectives of the participants (and as a
result, in other ways). I distinguish inquiry, justification, rational
persuasion, and negotiation as different (though often related and
overlapping) uses of arguments. (These are not to be confused with
types of dialogue.) The classification of argument types (e.g., deductive
vs. inductive, logical vs. dialectical vs. rhetorical), is a different matter,
and is a mug’s game, although these distinctions have other, useful
roles to play. The norms to be used in the assessment of arguments and
of argumentation ought to vary according to the perspective and
purpose of the assessor, and can accordingly have logical, dialectic or
rhetorical elements, or combinations of these. I discuss a number of
these ("soundness," inductive strength, presumptive force,
acceptability, relevance, sufficiency, conformity to ideal discussion
rules, argument schemes critical questions). The paper is a sketch of
what I hope to be a comprehensive and perspicuous conceptualization
of argument and argumentation at this stage in the theoretical
development of the field.
